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Abstract 
In this paper I try to analyse the impact of environmental policies in the presence of eco-
labelling on the wage level and production levels. For this I start with a general equilibrium 
framework where a country produces two traded goods using labour and capital, one of 
which pollutes when consumed. The pollution generated depends on the abatement 
technology used by the firms and also the scale of production and affects the health of 
workers and labour productivity. Since the consumers are adversely affected by the pollution 
generation, they are willing to pay a higher price for a cleaner variety of the dirty good. 
However, since the pollution is generated during production, they cannot judge the 
cleanliness of a good. Here the government steps in, monitors the pollution generation and 
issues an eco-labelling certificate regarding the quality. In this framework, analyse the impact 
of environmental standards on the wage levels and production. I find that a minimum 
standard adversely affects the wage rate, unless the productivity effect is very small. 
However, the eco-labelling process aides the labour market as it tempers the impact of the 
standard on wages.   
Keywords: Eco-labelling, environmental standard,  general equilibrium, product quality. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Eco-labelling has become extremely popular in the developed countries and is slowly making 
its presence felt in less developed countries as well. It is a process which helps overcome the 
information problem associated with the generation of pollution during production, the steps 
taken for abatement and the gradation of products according to their cleanliness. Several 
studies have shown that consumers are increasingly becoming environment-conscious and are 
willing to pay a higher price for eco-friendly products. Forsyth et. al. (1990), Irland (1993), 
Nimon and Beghin (1999),  discuss the impact of eco-labelling on price of products. Nimon 
and Beghin (1999), for example, observe that “eco-labeled apparel items command a price 
premium of about 30% relative to comparable conventional apparel items” in the US markets. 
Mattoo and Singh (1994) and Upton and Bass (1996) also observe that 80% of consumers in 
UK and Canadian markets are willing to pay more for environmental-friendly goods. Since 
the pollution is often generated during the production stage, they have no means of verifying 
the producers’ claim regarding their level of cleanliness and a typical adverse selection 
problem arises. Unable to differentiate between clean and dirty varieties, the consumers do 
not pay the price premium to clean goods, making it unprofitable for firms to invest in 
abatement. Thus, the market for clean goods collapses. This is where a third, neutral party 
like the government or some other agency steps in. They verify the claims of the firms and 
issue a certificate regarding the pollution emitted during the production of the good. This 
certificate is usually valid for a specific period of time and the firm can use this “eco-label” 
on its products for that period. These ‘eco-labelled’ goods command a higher price in the 
market and thus, eco-labelling is becoming increasingly popular. However, this whole 
process is costly. Verification of pollution generation is an expensive process requiring a lot 
of monitoring and technology and hence, the certificate has to be obtained at a price by the 
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firms from the agency. This often acts as a deterrent, specially for smaller firms and thus, 
governments often give subsidies and other incentives to promote clean products. Eco-
labelling, government subsidies to promote it, taxes on dirty products, their impact on the 
environment and welfare in general have been widely discussed in literature. The impact of 
these policies on the labour market, have received relatively less attention.  
 
There have been a few studies that have analysed how environmental regulation affects 
employment. The “double dividend hypothesis” which claims that environmental protection 
and social objectives like employment generation may go hand in hand has been hotly 
debated. The theoretical literature indicates that very restrictive conditions must be met for 
the recycling of environmental taxation to produce an increase in employment. In an 
empirical study, Morgenstern et al (2002) have examined the “jobs versus environment” 
debate at the industry level for four heavily polluting industries: pulp and paper mills, plastic 
manufactures, petroleum refiners and iron and steel mills of USA. They have shown that an 
increase in environmental spending does not cause a significant change in the employment. 
The relationship between environmental protection and sectoral unemployment has been 
addressed in a Harris-Todaro framework in many papers. In a closed model, Daitoh (2003) 
analyses the effect of an increase in the pollution tax rate on manufacturing employment and 
urban unemployment. He argues that while an increase in the pollution tax rate will lower the 
scale of production, reducing employment, it will also induce substitution between labour and 
the dirty input and that  if the relative price-elasticity of relative demand for the manufactured 
good is sufficiently small then the substitution effect will dominate and manufacturing 
employment will rise.  Chao et al (2000) find that in a closed economy with sectoral 
unemployment, an increase in the preservation of the raw materials lead to a rise in urban 
unemployment ratio. However, in a small open economy, an increase in environmental 
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protection does not result in additional domestic unemployment. These papers talk of sectoral 
employment only and not aggregate employment in an open economy. This issue has been 
analysed by Sen and Acharyya (2007) and Wagner (2005) who have pointed out that while 
environmental regulation has an adverse effect on aggregate employment as production shifts 
to cleaner and more capital intensive technology, these is also a corresponding increase in 
abatement activities which generate employment and may offset the initial loss.  
 
None of the above papers take into consideration the fact that environmental regulation may 
affect the health of the workers and hence, labour productivity and this can have a significant 
impact on employment. Only a few papers discuss the impact of environmental regulation on 
health and labour productivity. Chakraborty and Mitra (2005) observed that the health of the 
workers improved after environmental regulations were imposed in the lead-smelting sector 
in Calcutta, India. Williams III (2002) has analysed the case where an increase in 
environmental tax lowers pollution level and improves the health of workers. The reduction 
in pollution directly increases the utility of consumers. At the same time improved health 
increases the labour productivity by reducing the time-spent sick by a worker. This influences 
a person’s labour-leisure decisions and affects labour supply. Sen and Acharyya (2012) 
showed that environmental standards may raise aggregate employment as the productivity 
effect makes labour relatively less costly and induces capital to be substituted with labour. 
Thus, demand for labour increases and though the direct impact of the productivity effect is 
negative, the increased production of labour intensive goods may result in increased 
employment. The paper, however, assumes that the labour productivity is affected only by the 
environmental-quality of the dirty good and the total output does not play a part. In other 
words, the scale effect on pollution is totally ignored. Also, wages are assumed to be rigid, 
and hence the impact of environmental standards on the wage levels has not been analysed.  
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In this paper I take into account the scale effect and  that pollution depends the total output of 
the dirty good as well as the abatement technology used and try to analyse the impact of an 
environmental standard on the labour market, in particular, the wage rate of unskilled labour 
when the emissions affect health and labour productivity adversely.  I show that the eco-
labelling process actually aides the labour market as it tempers the adverse effect of the 
standard on wages.  
 
2. The Model 
In order to study the impact of environmental policies on wages, I adopt a general 
equilibrium framework where two traded goods are being produced (one clean and one dirty) 
in a small open economy. The two goods use two factors of production- unskilled labour (L) 
and capital (K). The clean good T can be considered to be a composite of all clean tradables 
that are produced in the country, while the dirty good Z which generates pollution when 
produced is a quality-differentiated good and can be produced in different qualities.  The 
quality of Z is characterised by the amount of pollution generated during its production which 
in turn depends on abatement technology used.  If Z is produced using a more sophisticated 
abatement technology such that less pollution is generated during production, then it is said to 
be a better or cleaner variety. The quality of Z is indexed by ],0[ AA  with A  being the 
quality of the cleanest good that can be produced by the present state of technology. A higher 
A implies that lesser pollution is generated by Z. Thus, the technology available to the firm 
allows him to produce any quality between ],0[ A , and the quality chosen by the firm is 
endogenously determined. Such characterisation has been done previously by Arora and 
Gangopadhyay (1995), Bansal and Gangopadhyay (2003) and Sen and Acharyya (2012).  
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This paper deviates a slightly from these papers in that the above papers assume that A is 
observable to all while here I assume that consumers cannot verify environmental-quality 
unless the firms obtain an eco-labelling certificate from the government. Eco-labelling of 
dirty goods is assumed to be compulsory and the government charges a price M for this 
service.  
 
As the country under consideration is assumed to be small and open, it cannot influence the 
world price of any of the two traded goods by varying its volume of trade. The prices of T 
and Z are thus, determined by the world markets.  World price of T is taken to be    
  while 
that of Z is    
 . Since the consumers are environment-conscious, they are willing to pay a 
higher amount for a cleaner variety. 
 );(
** APP ZZ       0,0
** 



ZZ PP  (1) 
The two goods are produced with unskilled labour (L), and capital (K).  Their production 
technologies are assumed to be Leontief or fixed coefficient technology. That is, one unit of 
T requires    units of L and     units of capital. In the same way, a particular variety of Z 
uses labour and capital in fixed proportions (    and    ), but a cleaner variety of Z is more 
capital intensive
1
. That is,  
            ;     
       (2) 
So that,  
      
   
   
      
   
   
     ̅ 
   
 
It is further assumed that the dirty good is in general, more labour intensive than the clean 
good T, though cleaner varieties of Z are more capital intensive than the dirtier ones. This is 
                                                          
1
 See Figure 1. 
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reasonable enough as most of the dirty goods are manufacturing goods which are relatively 
more labour intensive than the other traded sectors, like the service sector (insurance, 
banking, information and technology, etc.) which requires huge capital investments. 
However, as I will show later, my analysis holds even if the intensity assumption is reversed.  
 
For convenience we give below a table of all notations used in this paper. 
 
Z Environmental-quality differentiated traded good 
T Composite traded good 
L Unskilled Labour 
K Capital 
w  Wage rate of unskilled labour 
R Rate of return to capital 
*
TP  International price of T  
)(* APZ  International price of Z 
ija  Amount of ith input used for one unit production of  j. 
jX  Output of the jth good 
E Pollution level 
K  Total capital in the economy 
L  Total labour in the economy 
ij  Share of the i
th 
 input in the price of the j
th 
product. 
8 
 
 ij  Share of the i
th
 input in the j
th
 sector  
  Environmental-quality elasticity of capital in  the production of Z 
  Environmental-quality elasticity of the price of Z 
M Ratio of averge fixed cost to price of Z 
  Productivity effect 
Te  quality elasticity of pollution 
 
The total pollution level in the country depends on the total output of the dirty good, and the 
abatement technology used. A cleaner variety of Z lowers the pollution level, while an 
increase in the scale of production raises it. That is,  
           ;         
  
  
        
  
   
   (3) 
Thus, the scale and the technique effects are captured by    and A respectively. The pollution 
in the country adversely affects the health of the workers and lowers their productivity. So, 
the labour coefficients are  
                   
               j=T, Z   (4) 
The productivity effect is assumed to be uniform on all workers and is defined as the 
proportional change in labour required to produce one unit of j due to one percent increase in 
the pollution level and is written as, 
   
   
  
   
   (5) 
As the economy is perferctly competitive, and the country is small and open, the prices of the 
two goods are equal to their average costs. So,  
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 ZKZLZZ XMrAaweaAP /)()()(
*     (6) 
 raweaP KTLTT  )(
*    (7) 
Here, the firms producing dirty good has to bear a fixed cost M, which is the cost of eco 
labelling their products in addition to the variable costs of labour and capital. The 
environmental-quality is chosen by them so that the marginal benefit (profit) from one 
additional increment to quality equals the marginal cost of quality improvement. Or,  
 rAaw
A
e
eaAP KZLZZ )()()(
* 




   (8) 
This, implies, that at the optimum environmental-quality   , the price line of Z is tangent to 
the average cost curve. (See Figure 2). The equation (8) yields the following relationship 
which holds only at the optimum
2
. 
 KZLZTe    (9) 
Where        )(/)( ** APAAP ZZ

  
                   0



e
A
A
e
eT   captures the technique effect 
 and             )(/)( AaAaA KZKZ  
The total labour and capital in the economy,  ̅      ̅  are divided between the two sectors 
and their output depends on this stock of resources available in the economy. 
 ZLZTLT XeaXeaL )()(   (10) 
 ZKZTKT XAaXaK )(  (11) 
                                                          
2
 See Appendix A for derivations. 
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Thus, in equilibrium, the output produced in the economy is   
   and    
  . (See Figure 3).  
 
3. Imposition of a Minimum Environmental Standard 
Since we have assumed that wages are flexible and the labour market is in full employment, 
any environmental policy will not affect the level of employment and their impact on the 
labour market will boil down to changes in wages. In this section I analyse the impact of an 
imposition of minimum environmental standards on the environmental pollution and wages. 
 
Suppose the government decides to impose a minimum environmental standard    which is 
above the quality that was being originally produced in the economy. That is, the government 
now requires that firms generating pollution adopt better abatement technology than that they 
were adopting before. So, their average cost function does not change, but now 
environmental-quality is no longer a choice variable for the firms. They have to produce   . 
The average cost for    is naturally higher than that of   .  Competitive forces again work 
towards maintaining the zero-profit condition (6) and so factor returns adjust. The marginal 
condition (8) is now no longer satisfied and at    3 
      KZLZTe     (12) 
The change in wages and returns to capital depend on changes in environmental quality 
which necessitate greater capital investment in the Z sctor and withdrawal from the T sector, 
the changes in the total pollution levels which affect the labour productivity in both sectors 
and the change in output of Z which changes the average fixed cost. So, from equations (6) 
and (7) we can write (13) and (14) respectively. 
                                                          
3
 See Figure 2. 
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     ZLZKZKZLZ XmeArw ˆˆˆˆˆ    (13) 
   erw LTKTLT ˆˆˆ     (14) 
Where 0
)(
)(



Aa
AAa
KZ
KZ   and  
ZZ XAP
M
m
)(*
  
The level of pollution changes due to both the scale and the technique effect. 
  ̂      ̂     ̂  (15) 
For simplicity we assume that one unit increase in production raises pollution levels by one 
unit. That is,     
  
   
  
 
      
The environmental standard generates a change in the production pattern in the economy. As 
the Z sector has to produce cleaner goods, it requires more capital and draws it from the clean 
sector, T. So, even at original output level of Z, T sector contracts. At the same time, the shift 
towards a cleaner variety of the dirty good improves the labour productivity and increases the 
effective supply of labour. This will encourage an expansion of the labour-intensive Z sector 
and a further contraction of the T sector. However, the increase in the scale of production of 
the dirty good increases pollution and overall pollution may increase despite the imposition 
of minimum standards if the scale effect is strong enough to dominate the technique effect. 
However, in that case, labour productivity will fall, and there will be a decrease in the 
effective supply of labour.  The overall change in output of Z and T due to environmental 
standards can be obtained from equations (10) and (11). 
4
 
    0ˆ1ˆ
1


 AeX LZKZKZTT   (16) 
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 See Appendix B for derivations. 
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   0ˆ1ˆ
1


 AeX KTTLTKZZ   (17) 
Where 
 0  ,0  as 
 0)(1




KZLTKTLZ
KZLTKTLZKT
 
The equilibrium shifts from E0 to E1. So, the output of T decreases on two counts. One, the 
productivity effect increases effective supply of labour, causing output of capital intensive T 
to fall. This is captured by the first term in equation (16) and a movement from E0 to E2 in 
Figure 3. Second, capital is withdrawn by the Z sector for its own quality-improvement. This 
is captured by the coefficient of  , the second term in equation (16) and a movement from E2 
to E1. In contrast, the productivity effect and the quality-improvement drive up the production 
of Z.   
 
Lemma 1: The level of pollution falls only if the technique effect is sufficiently strong.  
Proof: As a minimum standard is imposed, the abatement technology has to improve and the 
technique effect lowers pollution. However, as the production of the dirty good increases, the 
scale effect raises the pollution. So pollution can only fall is the technique effect is 
sufficiently strong. To be more precise, if 
 


 LTKZTe     as           Aee LTKZT ˆˆ      
The change in the output levels and the reallocation of factors of production between the two 
sectors results in a change in wages and rate of returns. 
Proposition 1: For an environmental standard to lead to a rise in wages, the necessary 
condition is that the productivity effect must be very low. 
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Proof: The change in the wages of unskilled labour can be written as 
 
     ZKZLTTKZLZTKT XmAeew ˆˆ1ˆ  

 (18) 
Where 0 LTKZKTLZ   
Thus,        Aemeew KTTLTKZKZLTTKZLZTKT ˆ
11
ˆ
1














 

 
Now,   0 KZLZTe   (as shown in (12));  And, 0KZLTTe   
 Also,   0 KTTKZLT e   as 0 , 0 ,0  Te ;  
So, necessary condition for 0ˆ w  is that   0m  
Or,  


m
       
Thus, a minimum environmental standard lowers the wage rate unless the productivity effect 
is very low. Two major factors pushing down wages are as follows. One, the productivity 
effect raises the effective supply of labour and this pushes down wages. Second, the standard 
creates a distortion with the marginal cost of quality now becoming greater than the marginal 
benefit and competitive forces causing the wages to fall.  The only factor in favour of wages 
is the fact that the standard causes production of dirty goods to increase, lowering the average 
fixed cost of the labour intensive good.  
4. The Importance of Eco Labelling 
The eco-labelling process which raises the average cost of production of the dirty good, 
actually softens the sting of the environmental standard on the wage rate. To demonstrate the 
14 
 
role of the eco –labelling process, I lay out the structure without the eco-labelling. The price 
of the dirty good which equals the average cost is now, 
 rAaweaAP KZLZZ )()()(
*     (19) 
Thus, when the standard raises the production of Z, this has no effect on the average cost. 
Earlier, average fixed cost would fall with increased output. So now, the wage adjustment is 
as follows: 
 
     ZKZLTTKZLZTKT XAeew ˆˆ
1
ˆ 


 (20) 
Proposition 2: In the absence of the eco-labelling process, an environmental standard lowers 
wage rate. 
Proof: In equation (20),  0ˆ w  as 0 .  So, the wage rate now decreases on all counts 
and there is nothing to push it up.     
Thus, though an environmental standard usually has an adverse impact on the wages, the eco-
labelling process tempers the bite and  may also turn the situation and raise wages when 
productivity effect is high. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper I have studied the role of the eco-labelling process on the labour market, in 
particular, the wage rate. It has been shown that imposition of an environmental standard 
force firms to adopt a better abatement technology, but it also prompts them to raise their 
output. Thus, while pollution falls due to the technique effect, the scale effect raises it. Wage 
rate falls, unless the productivity effect is extremely small. Noteworthy is the fact that the 
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eco-labelling process softens the impact of the standard on the wage rate and thus, should be 
seen as a boon for the labour market. 
 
Appendix A 
Equation (8) can be rewritten as 
 












 





















 


)()(
)(
)()(
)(
)(
)(
***
*
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ra
Aa
AAa
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e
A
A
e
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eea
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AAP
Z
KZ
KZ
KZ
Z
LZ
LZ
LZ
Z
Z    (A1) 
Or,       KZLZTe    
Where 0
)(
)(
  ;  0  ; 0 
)(
)(
  ;  0
)(
)(
*
*










Aa
AAa
e
A
A
e
e
ea
eea
AP
AAP
KZ
KZ
T
LZ
LZ
Z
Z   
Appendix B 
Differentiating equation (10), 
  eXX KTLTZLZTLT ˆˆˆ    
Substituting eˆ  from (12),  
   AeXX TZLZTLT ˆˆˆ    (B1) 
Differentiating equation (11), 
 AXX KZZKZTKT
ˆˆˆ     (B2) 
The expressions for ZT XX
ˆ  and ˆ can be arrived at by solving (B1) and (B2).  
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